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ESSAY 
Behavioral Economics and Investor Protection: 
Reasonable Investors, Efficient Markets 
Barbara Black* 
“[M]y questions about the stock market have hardened into a larger 
puzzle: a major industry appears to be built largely on an illusion of 
skill.”1 
– Daniel Kahneman 
 
The judicial view of a “reasonable investor” plays an important role 
in federal securities regulation.  Courts express great confidence in the 
reasonable investor’s cognitive abilities, a view not shared by 
behavioral economists.  Similarly, the efficient market hypothesis has 
exerted a powerful influence in securities regulation, although empirical 
evidence calls into question some of the basic assumptions underlying 
it.  Unfortunately, to date, courts have acknowledged the discrepancy 
between legal theory and behavioral economics only in one situation: 
class certification of federal securities class actions.  It is time for courts 
to address the gap between judicial expectations about the behavior of 
reasonable investors and behavioral economists’ views of investors’ 
cognitive shortcomings, consistent with the central purpose of federal 
securities regulation: protecting investors from fraud. 
I. THE RATIONALITY OF THE “REASONABLE INVESTOR”: LAW AND 
BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS 
The elements of a private federal securities fraud claim under Rule 
10b-5 include a misstatement of a material fact and the investor’s 
 
* Charles Hartsock Professor of Law and Director, Corporate Law Center, University of 
Cincinnati College of Law.  This Essay was prepared for the Second Annual Institute for Investor 
Protection Conference, “Behavioral Economics and Investor Protection,” held at Loyola 
University Chicago School of Law on October 5, 2012.  Many thanks to Michael Kaufman, 
Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, for inviting me to participate in the Conference. 
1. DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 212 (2011). 
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reliance on that misstatement.2  Because materiality is defined as 
information that a reasonable investor would consider important in 
making investment decisions,3 the reasonable investor standard serves 
to distinguish between material and immaterial statements and hence to 
determine defendants’ disclosure obligations.  The Supreme Court tells 
us that courts should not treat reasonable investors like “nitwits”4 and 
ascribe to them “child-like simplicity.”5  In the same vein, courts have 
stated disclosure should not be tailored to “what is fit for rubes.”6  To 
the contrary, defendants can engage in optimistic sales talk with 
impunity; since reasonable investors will not be misled by puffery, it is 
immaterial as a matter of law.7  Similarly, corporations and securities 
salesmen are not required to disclose information that should be obvious 
to reasonable investors.  Thus, courts tell us that reasonable investors 
“can do the math” to figure out the financial bottom line in at least some 
circumstances.8  Additionally, courts expect reasonable investors to 
have an awareness of general economic conditions9 and to understand 
the principle of diversification,10 the time-value of money,11 the nature 
of margin accounts,12 and the securities industry’s compensation 
 
2. More precisely, the elements of a private Rule 10b-5 claim are: “(1) a material 
misrepresentation or omission by the defendant; (2) scienter; (3) a connection between the 
misrepresentation or omission and the purchase or sale of a security; (4) reliance upon the 
misrepresentation or omission; (5) economic loss; and (6) loss causation.”  Matrixx Initiatives, 
Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309, 1317–18 (2011) (quoting Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. 
Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 157 (2008)). 
3. See TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (defining materiality in 
the context of omissions from proxy statements as what a reasonable shareholder would consider 
important in deciding how to vote); Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 232 (1988) (adopting 
the TSC standard for materiality in cases of misrepresentations influencing an investor’s decision 
to sell). 
4. Basic, 485 U.S. at 234 (quoting Flamm v. Eberstadt, 814 F.2d 1169, 1175 (7th Cir. 1987)). 
5. Id. 
6. Flamm v. Eberstadt, 814 F.2d 1169, 1175 (7th Cir. 1987). 
7. Bogart v. Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc., No. 91 CIV. 1036 (LBS) (NG), 1995 WL 46399, at 
*2–3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 1995).  But see Peter H. Huang, Moody Investing and the Supreme Court: 
Rethinking the Materiality of Information and the Reasonableness of Investors, 13 SUP. CT. 
ECON. REV. 99, 112–18 (2005) (arguing that the current judicial treatment of puffery is flawed 
because it neglects the power of puffery to alter moods). 
8. See In re Merck & Co. Sec. Litig., 432 F.3d 261, 270–71 (3d Cir. 2005) (treating a 
piecemeal disclosure requiring mathematical calculations and assumptions as a factual disclosure 
of the solution); Stefan J. Padfield, Who Should Do the Math? Materiality Issues in Disclosures 
that Require Investors to Calculate the Bottom Line, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 927, 943–44 (2007) 
(explaining how courts apply the general rule that failure to perform mathematical calculations 
for investors is not a material omission). 
9. In re Donald Trump Casino Sec. Litig., 7 F.3d 357, 377 (3d Cir. 1993). 
10. Dodds v. Cigna Sec., Inc., 12 F.3d 346, 351 (2d Cir. 1993). 
11. Levitin v. PaineWebber, Inc., 159 F.3d 698, 702 (2d Cir. 1998). 
12. Zerman v. Ball, 735 F.2d 15, 21 (2d Cir. 1984). 
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structure.13  In short, courts hold investors to a high standard of 
rationality that may not comport with observed reality.14  Recent studies 
consistently show that retail investors lack basic financial literacy.15 
The judicial view of a reasonable investor is also important in 
delineating the reliance element of a private Rule 10b-5 claim.  From 
Rule 10b-5’s early days, courts required investors to establish reliance 
on a material misstatement because otherwise securities laws would 
create a “scheme of investors’ insurance.”16  The treatment of reliance 
in private securities fraud actions, however, differs significantly from 
common law tort principles.  At common law, victims of fraud did not 
have to establish “reasonable” reliance, which is an objective standard.  
Instead, they had to prove “justifiable” reliance,17 which is “a matter of 
the qualities and characteristics of the particular plaintiff, and the 
circumstances of the particular case, rather than of the application of a 
community standard of conduct to all cases.”18  Moreover, under 
common law, “a person is justified in relying on a representation of fact 
‘although he might have ascertained the falsity of the representation had 
he made an investigation.’”19  Courts, however, have taken a less 
forgiving view under federal securities laws and imposed greater due 
diligence responsibilities on investors.20  For example, a widow with a 
 
13. Platsis v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., 946 F.2d 38, 41 (6th Cir. 1991). 
14. See Margaret V. Sachs, Materiality and Social Change: The Case for Replacing “the 
Reasonable Investor” with “the Least Sophisticated Investor” in Inefficient Markets, 81 TUL. L. 
REV. 473, 473 (2006) (describing the judicial characterization of the reasonable investor as a 
“savvy person who grasps market fundamentals”); David A. Hoffman, The “Duty” to Be a 
Rational Shareholder, 90 MINN. L. REV. 537, 538–39 (2006) (describing the “rationality burden” 
courts impose on investors). 
15. See, e.g., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, STUDY REGARDING FINANCIAL LITERACY AMONG 
INVESTORS, at vii–viii (2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2012/917-financial-
literacy-study-part1.pdf.  
16. List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 463 (2d Cir. 1965) (adopting a subjective 
standard of reliance).  See also Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 345 (2005) 
(explaining that the purpose of securities law is “to protect [investors] against those economic 
losses that misrepresentations actually cause”). 
17. Professor Dobbs agrees that “[r]eliance upon the defendant’s material representations is 
ordinarily justified unless the plaintiff is on notice that the statement is not to be trusted or knows 
the statement to be false.”  DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 474, at 1359 (2000).  However, 
he takes issue with the Restatement (Second) of Torts’ description of justifiable reliance as 
subjective in all instances.  DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 672, at 669 (2d ed. 
2011). 
18. Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59, 71 (1995) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 
545A, cmt. b (1976)). 
19. Id. at 70 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 540 (1976)). 
20. Under section 21D(f)(10)(A)(i)(II) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-
4(f)(10)(A)(i)(I)–(II) (2006), a person “knowingly commits a violation of securities laws” based 
on an untrue statement of material fact when he has actual knowledge that the representation is 
false and persons are likely to “reasonably rely” on the misrepresentation.  
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tenth grade education was expected to read and understand written 
disclosures about risk and illiquidity in a lengthy complex prospectus 
rather than rely on oral representations of suitability made by her 
broker.21 
Behavioral economists, by contrast, do not observe real people 
investing in today’s markets behaving as the reasonable investors that 
federal securities law expects them to be.22  These cognitive errors 
affect decisions made by both retail investors and financial practitioners 
and go beyond issues of financial literacy.  Studies show that many 
investors are not rational in their decision-making; there are observable 
biases resulting from departures from rational decision-making.23  
Researchers have compiled an extensive catalogue of investors’ 
cognitive errors.  These include: loss aversion (investors are reluctant to 
sell losing stocks even when advantageous for them to do so),24 
overconfidence (investors, particularly male investors, are 
overconfident in their investment strategies),25 and representativeness 
heuristic (investors chase trends believing they have systematic 
causes).26  More generally, the nature of investing itself may induce 
investors to treat it as a game or as gambling.27  To date, courts have not 
acknowledged this gap between judicial expectations about the behavior 
 
21. See Dodds v. Cigna Sec., Inc., 12 F.3d 346, 350–51 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Armstrong v. 
McAlpin, 699 F.2d 79, 88 (2d Cir. 1983)) (applying an objective test in determining when the 
widowed plaintiff should have had constructive notice of fraud for purposes of the statute of 
limitations); Kosovich v. Metro Homes, No. 09 Civ. 6992 (JSR), 2009 WL 5171737, at *4 
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 2009) (stating that the plaintiff’s “professed financial cluelessness is beside 
the point if he acted unreasonably”), aff’d, 405 F. App’x. 540 (2d Cir. 2010).  See also Barbara 
Black & Jill I. Gross, Making It Up as They Go Along: The Role of Law in Securities Arbitration, 
23 CARDOZO L. REV. 991, 1038 n.303 (2002) (listing cases where summary judgment was 
awarded for broker-dealer due to lack of justifiable reliance). 
22. See generally MEIR STATMAN, WHAT INVESTORS REALLY WANT (2011) (describing how 
cognitive errors and emotions drive investment decisions); HERSH SHEFRIN, BEYOND GREED 
AND FEAR (2000) (describing how behavioral heuristics, biases, errors, and framing affect how 
financial practitioners make investment decisions). 
23. Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency Twenty 
Years Later: The Hindsight Bias, 28 J. CORP. L. 715, 723 (2003) [hereinafter MOME II]. 
24. Terrance Odean, Are Investors Reluctant to Realize Their Losses?, 53 J. FIN. 1775, 1781–
95 (1998). 
25. Terrance Odean, Do Investors Trade Too Much?, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 1279, 1280–92 
(1999); Kent Daniel, David Hirshleifer & Avanidhar Subrahmanyam, Investor Psychology and 
Security Under- and Overreactions, 53 J. FIN. 1839, 1844–45 (1998). 
26. David Hirshleifer, Investor Psychology and Asset Pricing, 56 J. FIN. 1533, 1545–46 
(2001). 
27. See STATMAN, supra note 22, at 56 (“Profits are the utilitarian benefits of winning the 
beat-the-market game, and cognitive errors and emotions mislead us into thinking that winning is 
easy.  But we are also drawn into the game by the promise of expressive and emotional 
benefits.”). 
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of reasonable investors and behavioral economists’ views of investors’ 
cognitive shortcomings. 
II. RELIANCE AND THE “FRAUD ON THE MARKET” PRESUMPTION 
The Supreme Court has recognized the difficulties in establishing 
reliance in securities fraud actions and has mitigated the burden on 
investors in two circumstances.  Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. 
United States28 held that if there is an omission of a material fact by one 
with a duty to disclose, the investor to whom the duty was owed need 
not provide specific proof of reliance.29  The Affiliated Ute presumption 
is of limited utility, however, since courts generally treat allegations of 
misleading disclosure as misrepresentation and not nondisclosure 
claims.30  In addition, courts may not recognize a duty to disclose 
material information in the absence of a traditional fiduciary 
relationship.31 
The second situation in which there is a rebuttable presumption of 
reliance is the fraud-on-the-market presumption set forth in Basic Inc. v. 
Levinson.32  If the plaintiffs meet the prerequisites of fraud-on-the-
market, it is presumed that the misleading information is reflected in the 
market price at the time of the transaction.  Although it is available in 
both individual and class actions, the fraud-on-the-market presumption 
assumes great importance in Rule 10b-5 class actions because otherwise 
individual questions of reliance would predominate and claims of 
multiple investors could not be aggregated in a class action.33  To 
invoke the fraud-on-the-market presumption, plaintiffs must show that 
 
28. 406 U.S. 128 (1972).  Affiliated Ute addressed the reliance requirement in a case involving 
rather unusual facts.  Plaintiffs, mixed-bloods of the Ute Indian Tribe, sued a bank and two of its 
employees.  Id. at 140.  The bank had acted as a transfer agent for stock of a corporation formed 
for the purpose of distributing tribal assets.  Id. at 13637.  Although the attorneys of the 
corporation requested that the bank discourage resales of the stock, the bank’s employees actively 
encouraged a secondary market among non-Indians.  Id. at 14546, 152.  Additionally, the 
defendants “devised a plan and induced the mixed-blood holders of [the] stock to dispose of their 
shares without disclosing to them material facts that reasonably could have been expected to 
influence their decisions to sell.”  Id. at 153.  
29. Id. at 153–54 (“Under the circumstances of this case . . . positive proof of reliance is not a 
prerequisite to recovery.  All that is necessary is that the facts withheld be material . . . .  This 
obligation to disclose and this withholding of a material fact establish the requisite element of 
causation of fact.”). 
30. Binder v. Gillespie, 184 F.3d 1059, 1063–64 (9th Cir. 1999). 
31. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 239 n.17 (1988) (“Silence, absent a duty to 
disclose, is not misleading under Rule 10b-5.”). 
32. Id. at 241–47. 
33. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) (requiring that questions of law or fact common to the class 
predominate over questions affecting individual members of the class).  
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the stock traded in an efficient market,34 the alleged misrepresentation 
was publicly known, and the transaction took place between the time 
the misrepresentation was made and the time the truth was discovered.35 
Apart from the “truth on the market” defense, which refutes the 
materiality of the misleading disclosure by showing that other 
information in the marketplace ameliorated its effect,36 it is not clear 
how the fraud-on-the-market presumption can be rebutted.37  Short 
sellers illustrate the difficulty.  If, in response to corporate disclosures, 
they are selling shares when most traders are buying, it can be argued 
that short sellers are not relying on those disclosures.38  On the other 
hand, short sellers may disbelieve management’s statements without 
necessarily believing that the disclosures are fraudulent, in which case 
they are relying on the integrity of the market price and have suffered an 
injury by trading the stock at a distorted price.39 
In the early post-Basic years, it could plausibly be argued that the 
fraud-on-the-market presumption was best understood as eliminating 
reliance as a required element in securities fraud actions (at least in 
those involving secondary trading in publicly traded securities) and 
placing the analytical emphasis on causation.40  The Supreme Court, 
however, distinguished between reliance and loss causation in Dura 
 
34. Courts generally apply the factors set forth in Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1264, 
1286–87 (D.N.J. 1989): the average weekly trading volume; the number of analysts following the 
security; the extent to which market makers traded the security; the issuer’s eligibility to file a 
Form S-3 registration statement; and the cause-and-effect relationship between material 
disclosures and changes in the security’s price.  Additional factors include the company’s market 
capitalization; the size of the public float; the ability to short sell the security; and the level of 
autocorrelation.  In re DVI, Inc. Sec. Litig., 639 F.3d 623, 633 n.14 (3d Cir. 2011).  See also 
Krogman v. Sterritt, 202 F.R.D. 467, 478 (N.D. Tex. 2001) (considering the difference between 
the price at which investors are willing to buy the security versus the price at which they are 
willing to sell, along with the size of the float for the security). 
35. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2185 (2011).  Proof of 
materiality is not a prerequisite to certification of a securities fraud class action.  Amgen Inc. v. 
Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1195–97 (2013). 
36. Ganino v. Citizens Utils. Co., 228 F.3d 154, 167 (2d Cir. 2000). 
37. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 248 (“Any showing that severs the link between the alleged 
misrepresentation and either the price received (or paid) by the plaintiff, or his decision to trade at 
a fair market price, will be sufficient to rebut the presumption of reliance.”). 
38. See Zlotnick v. TIE Commc’ns, 836 F.2d 818, 821–23 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding that the 
fraud-on-the-market presumption was not available to a short seller, who instead must establish 
actual reliance). 
39. See Schleicher v. Wendt, 618 F.3d 679, 684 (7th Cir. 2010) (rejecting defendants’ 
arguments that short sellers could be excluded from the class). 
40. See generally Barbara Black, The Strange Case of Fraud on the Market: A Label in 
Search of a Theory, 52 ALB. L. REV. 923 (1988) (arguing that fraud-on-the-market is best 
conceptualized in terms of causation rather than reliance). 
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Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo41 and Erica P. John Fund v. 
Halliburton.42  Halliburton, in particular, reaffirmed the traditional role 
of reliance in establishing a connection between the misrepresentation 
and the injury.43 
III. THE EFFICIENT MARKET HYPOTHESIS AND BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS 
The efficient market hypothesis has exerted a powerful influence on 
securities regulation.44  Its basic tenets can be succinctly stated.  In 
efficient markets, securities prices fully reflect available information 
because “professionally-informed traders quickly notice and take 
advantage of mispricing, thereby driving prices back to their proper 
level.”45  The efficient market hypothesis, therefore, is grounded in 
three assumptions: 
First, investors are assumed to be rational and hence to value securities 
rationally. Second, to the extent that some investors are not rational, 
their trades are random and therefore cancel each other out without 
affecting prices. Third, to the extent that investors are irrational in 
similar ways, they are met in the market by rational arbitrageurs who 
eliminate their influence on prices.46 
According to behavioral finance scholars, however, “many investors 
are not rational in their financial decision-making, . . . there are 
observable directional biases resulting from departures from rational 
decision-making, and . . . significant barriers prevent professional 
traders from fully correcting the mistakes made by less than rational 
investors.”47 Accordingly, in contrast to the efficient market hypothesis, 
behavioral finance theory asserts that “systematic and significant 
deviations from efficiency are expected to persist for long periods of 
 
41. 544 U.S. 336, 342–44 (2005).  Dura held that an inflated purchase price does not itself 
prove causation and loss because precedent also requires a showing that the plaintiff would not 
have invested had he known the truth.  Id. 
42. 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2186 (2011).  Halliburton clarified that “[l]oss causation addresses a 
matter different from whether an investor relied on a misrepresentation,” as reliance focuses on 
the facts surrounding an investor’s decision to take part in the transaction.  Id. 
43. Id. 
44. The literature on the efficient market hypothesis, from both economists and legal scholars, 
is voluminous.  See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market 
Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 549–50 & nn.1–5 (1984) (discussing the legal field’s acceptance 
of the efficient market hypothesis and listing sources in which the efficient market hypothesis is 
discussed); MOME II, supra note 23 (analyzing the framework for market efficiency). 
45. MOME II, supra note 23, at 723.  
46. ANDREI SHLEIFER, INEFFICIENT MARKETS: AN INTRODUCTION TO BEHAVIORAL FINANCE 
2 (2000). 
47. MOME II, supra note 23, at 723–24. 
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time.”48 
Indeed, empirical evidence does call into question basic assumptions 
underlying the efficient market hypothesis.  As discussed earlier, it is 
increasingly difficult to sustain the case that investors act rationally in 
making investment decisions.49  Moreover, there are difficulties in 
assessing how markets react to information.  For example, it is a basic 
assumption that open and developed markets are sufficiently efficient so 
that publicly available material information affects stock prices.  Yet 
there are documented instances where this is not the case, as where the 
market did not react to publicly available information about the impact 
of a breakthrough in cancer research on a corporation until the New 
York Times wrote about it more than five months after the original 
release.50  Studies report examples of persistent mispricing, as where 
securities or their equivalents trade at different prices in different 
markets, even though arbitrage should correct these mispricings.51  
Finally, there is skepticism about whether investors rely on publicly 
available information (even indirectly) because “more than news seems 
to move stock prices.”52 
In short, contrary to the efficient market hypothesis, behavioral 
economics asserts that investors’ deviations from economic rationality 
are highly pervasive and systematic53 and that real-world arbitrage is 
risky and limited, unable to restore rationality to the markets.54 
 
48. SHLEIFER, supra note 46, at 2. 
49. See supra notes 22–27 and accompanying text (discussing examples of non-rational 
investment strategies). 
50. Frederick C. Dunbar & Dana Heller, Fraud on the Market Meets Behavioral Finance, 31 
DEL. J. CORP. L. 455, 509–10 (2006).  See also Donald C. Langevoort, Basic at Twenty: 
Rethinking Fraud on the Market, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 151, 173–74 [hereinafter Langevoort, Basic 
at Twenty] (discussing the dismissal of the plaintiffs’ securities fraud class action because of the 
market’s initial lack of reaction to news about Merck’s revenues). 
51. See Dunbar & Heller, supra note 50, at 478–79 (describing the persistent mispricing of 
two stocks, Royal Dutch and Shell Transport, that are backed by the same operating assets).  See 
generally Philip S. Russel, The Enigma of Closed-End Funds Pricing: Twenty-Six Years Later, 16 
INT’L J. FIN. 2985 (2004) (finding that theories do not account for persistent mispricing of closed-
end funds relative to net asset value).   
52. SHLEIFER, supra note 46, at 20 (noting that the 1987 market crash, when stocks dropped 
sharply and suddenly without any new information, is difficult to explain consistent with the 
efficient market hypothesis). 
53. Id. at 12 (citing Kahneman and Tversky’s research to show that “[i]nvestor sentiment 
reflects the common judgment errors made by a substantial number of investors, rather than 
uncorrelated random mistakes”). 
54. Id. at 13.  Gilson and Kraakman acknowledge that they underestimated institutional limits 
on arbitrage.  MOME II, supra note 23, at 736. 
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IV. RETHINKING BASIC IN LIGHT OF BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS 
It is frequently stated that the efficient market hypothesis is the 
underpinning of the fraud-on-the-market presumption; market 
efficiency has been described as “the cornerstone” of the fraud-on-the-
market presumption.55  In recent years, “[judicial] inquiry into 
efficiency has tended towards the zealous.”56  As one example, the First 
Circuit in In re PolyMedica Corp. Securities Litigation held: “For 
application of the fraud-on-the-market theory, we conclude that an 
efficient market is one in which the market price of the stock fully 
reflects all publicly available information.”57  As another example, a 
New Jersey federal district court held: 
The Efficient Market Hypothesis . . . is premised on the belief that 
individuals are rational, self-governing actors who are able to process 
the information wisely, and they do so promptly. . . .  The [Efficient 
Market] Hypothesis assumes that investors are rational risk calculators 
who consistently weigh the costs and benefits of alternatives and 
select the best option, thus causing the market’s immediate reaction to 
any financially-important news.58 
In short, rather than confining their scrutiny to objective market factors 
evidencing relative efficiency,59 some courts now require markets to 
live up to the impossibly high standard of the hypothetical reasonable 
investor who justifiably relies on corporate disclosures “wisely” and 
“promptly.”  A market cannot live up to this standard any more than an 
investor can.60 
To date, there have been only a handful of cases that refer to 
behavioral economics or behavioral finance in the context of class 
certification of securities fraud class actions.61   These cases predict that 
behavioral finance may lead to the demise of the fraud-on-the-market 
presumption: 
 
55. In re DVI, Inc. Sec. Litig., 639 F.3d 623, 633 (3d Cir. 2011), abrogated by Amgen Inc. v. 
Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184 (2013). 
56. DONNA M. NAGY ET AL., SECURITIES LITIGATION AND ENFORCEMENT: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 163 (3d ed. 2003). 
57. In re PolyMedica Corp. Sec. Litig., 432 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2005) (requiring 
informational, not fundamental, efficiency). 
58. In re Intelligroup Sec. Litig., 468 F. Supp. 2d 670, 696 (D.N.J. 2006) (internal citations 
omitted). 
59. See supra note 34 (listing relevant market factors). 
60. See Bradford Cornell, Market Efficiency and Securities Litigation: Implications of the 
Appellate Decision in Thane, 6 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 237, 254 (2011) (criticizing courts for 
viewing market efficiency as a yes-or-no question, rather than relatively and contextually). 
61. Indeed, at this Conference, the practitioners on the investor protection panel (one from the 
defense bar, one from plaintiffs’ bar) agreed on the irrelevance of economic theory “in the 
trenches.” 
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The emerging field of behavioral finance suggests that differing 
investor assessments of value appear to be the rule, rather than the 
exception.  Because the notion of information efficiency upon which 
the fraud-on-the-market presumption rests is crumbling under 
sustained academic scrutiny, the future of securities fraud class action 
litigation—dependent on this presumption—may be in jeopardy.62 
Similarly, this “emphasis on the rarity of efficient markets . . . would 
have the likely effect of making it unduly difficult to establish the fraud-
on-the-market presumption of reliance.”63 
I submit, however, that the persuasive power of Basic does not 
depend on acceptance of the efficient market hypothesis.  It is true that 
Basic refers to the efficient market hypothesis to acknowledge that “in 
an open and developed securities market, the price of the company’s 
stock is determined by the available material information regarding the 
company and its business . . . [and] [m]isleading statements will 
therefore defraud purchasers of stock even if the purchasers do not 
directly rely on the misstatements.”64 
At its core, however, Basic is a pragmatic, not a theoretical, opinion 
based on the purposes of federal securities laws, including the 
protection of investors and the enhancement of investor confidence.  
These purposes are furthered through full and accurate disclosure of 
material information.  The securities fraud class action plays an 
important role in carrying out these purposes.65  The Basic decision 
rests on the common sense propositions that “there cannot be honest 
markets without honest publicity”66 and the “fundamental purpose” of 
the Securities Exchange Act is “implementing a philosophy of full 
disclosure.”67  “Arising out of considerations of fairness, public policy, 
and probability, as well as judicial economy, presumptions are also 
 
62. In re PolyMedica Corp. Sec. Litig., 453 F. Supp. 2d 260, 272 n.10 (D. Mass. 2006) 
(citation omitted), on remand from 432 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2005). 
63. Xcelera.com Sec. Litig., 430 F.3d 503, 511 (1st Cir. 2005). 
64. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241–42 (1988) (quoting Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 
1154, 1160 (3d Cir. 1986)).  See also id. at 244 (“[T]he market is performing a substantial part of 
the valuation process performed by an investor in a face-to-face transaction” (quoting In re LTV 
Sec. Litig., 88 F.R.D. 134, 143 (N.D. Tex. 1980))). 
65. As Professor Langevoort expresses it: 
If Basic’s presumption is essentially an entitlement to rely on the market price as 
undistorted by fraud, it is hard to see why investors should lose that entitlement simply 
because of some market imperfection.  To the contrary, these kinds of imperfections 
would seem to strengthen, not weaken, the need for additional investor protection.   
Langevoort, Basic at Twenty, supra note 50, at 176.  
66. Basic, 485 U.S. at 230. 
67. Id. (quoting Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 478 (1977)). 
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useful devices for allocating the burdens of proof between parties.”68 
Accordingly, the Supreme Court in Basic concluded that the 
“presumption of reliance employed in this case is consistent with, and 
by facilitating Rule 10b-5 litigation, supports, the congressional policy 
embodied in the [Securities Exchange] Act.”69  Consistent with this 
pragmatic approach, the Court did not find it necessary to set forth a 
rigorous test for market efficiency.  Rather, it stated: “We need only 
believe that market professionals generally consider most publicly 
announced material statements about companies.”70 
Basic, of course, was decided in 1988.  Detractors of the opinion urge 
reconsideration because of additional knowledge about how markets 
really work.  In Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Retirement Funds & 
Trusts,71 which addressed the question whether proof of materiality is 
required at the class certification stage, corporate defendants and their 
advocates urged the Court to seize the opportunity to rethink the fraud-
on-the-market presumption and cited “the modesty of the economic 
reasoning that undergirds Basic’s presumption”72 as grounds to tighten 
the requirements for class certification in securities fraud class actions.  
A majority of the Justices, however, recognized that Congress addressed 
the policy question in the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 
1995 (PSLRA) and rejected calls to eliminate the fraud-on-the-market 
presumption.73 Nevertheless, it is likely that challenges to the fraud-on-
the-market presumption on the basis of behavioral finance will 
continue. 
I believe, however, that this debate over competing economic 
theories, while important and interesting, has nothing to do with the 
continuing viability of the fraud-on-the-market presumption.74  Rather, 
 
68. Id. at 245. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. at 246 n.24. 
71. 133 S. Ct. 1184 (2013). 
72. Brief of Amici Curiae Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, 
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, and Biotechnology Industry 
Organization Supporting Petitioners at 28, Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. 
Ct. 1184 (2013) (No. 11-1085).  
73. Amgen, 133 S. Ct. at 1201.  Specifically, the Court stated that through PSLRA, Pub. L. 
No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. (2006)), 
Congress “recognized that although private securities-fraud litigation furthers important public 
policy interests, prime among them, deterring wrongdoing and providing restitution to defrauded 
investors, such lawsuits have also been subject to abuse,” including frivolous claims to extract 
large settlements.  Amgen, 131 S. Ct. at 1200.  
74. I am not the first to make this argument.  See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Theories, 
Assumptions, and Securities Regulation: Market Efficiency Revisited, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 851, 
895 (1992) (explaining that the efficient market hypothesis is not meant to be used as a predictor 
of the behavior of individual investors). 
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Basic has two enduring messages. 
First, it does not make sense for investors to spend their time poring 
through lengthy and densely written disclosure documents.  Investors 
get information from many sources; perhaps their investing is informed 
by advice from their financial advisers, by reading financial articles, or 
by Internet chat rooms.  Given the variety and complexity of available 
information, the difficulty of evaluating this information, and the many 
other demands placed on investors’ time and energy, investors can 
reasonably decide it is sensible to treat stock prices as indicative of the 
stock’s value.  Accordingly, it is sufficient to believe that “market 
professionals generally consider most publicly announced material 
statements about companies.”75  As two commentators express it:  
Reliance on the integrity of the market price is sensibly presumed . . . 
if the market bears enough hallmarks of efficiency that investors, 
mindful of the costs they would incur if they went out and conducted 
their own research into stock values, reasonably could decide instead 
to treat the market’s price as indicative of fair value.76 
 Second, without the fraud-on-the-market presumption, plaintiffs 
would not be able to bring Rule 10b-5 class actions.77  What is the 
relevance of empirical evidence about anomalies in stock pricing, even 
that some investors could opt to trade in a crooked market,78 to the 
pragmatic view that federal securities class actions, as reformed by the 
PSLRA, should continue to exist to deter future violations and achieve 
at least some compensation for defrauded investors?79  Corporate 
defendants and their supporters dispute the benefits of this litigation, but 
both the Supreme Court and Congress have decided this question.  Any 
changes in policy must come from Congress. 
V. BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS IS RIGHT: REAL PEOPLE ARE NOT 
REASONABLE INVESTORS 
Behavioral economics is right that real people investing in today’s 
markets are not the “reasonable investors” the law expects them to be.80  
 
75. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 246 n.24 (1988). 
76. Bradford Cornell & James C. Rutten, Market Efficiency, Crashes, and Securities 
Litigation, 81 TUL. L. REV. 443, 449 (2006). 
77. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
78. According to Frederick Dunbar and Dana Heller, some rational investors are willing to 
gamble that they can get out of the market before general public awareness of the fraud destroys 
the market price of the stock.  Dunbar & Heller, supra note 50, at 504.  See also SHLEIFER, supra 
note 46, at 154, 157 (asserting that rational speculators can destabilize prices and cause bubbles). 
79. Barbara Black, Eliminating Securities Fraud Class Actions Under the Radar, 2009 
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 802, 817–18. 
80. See supra notes 22–27. 
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Yet, to date, behavioral economics has not caused any judicial re-
examination of materiality or justifiable reliance in situations where 
investors do not have the advantage of the fraud-on-the-market  
presumption.  Frequently, this occurs in situations where investors 
allege fraud in face-to-face dealings with their brokers or other financial 
advisers, where courts deny investors relief either because the 
misleading disclosures were not material (because the reasonable 
investor would not have relied on them81 or would already know the 
correct information),82 or because the investor’s reliance on oral 
representations was not reasonable since he could have discovered 
corrective information in a lengthy disclosure document.83 
Of course, as I have argued above with respect to the fraud-on-the-
market presumption and the efficient market hypothesis, legal reality 
and economic reality do not necessarily have to be in agreement.  Policy 
is the justification for legal fictions.  Just as the fraud-on-the-market 
presumption can stand even in the face of empirical evidence of market 
inefficiencies, the law can ascribe characteristics to a reasonable 
investor even though real investors may not possess them.   
What then are the policy considerations to support a “reasonable 
investor” standard that requires greater rationality than most investors 
possess?  Courts have not engaged in extensive policy analysis, but it 
appears that courts want people to make sensible investment decisions, 
and so they will deny them any recovery for their losses unless they live 
up to the “reasonable investor” standard.  Courts apparently believe that 
if we treat investors like children, nitwits, or rubes, they will act that 
way.84  Investing necessarily involves risk-taking; investors should not 
play the game unless they know what they are doing.85 
But is it good public policy to allow people to get away with fraud?  
Torts scholars have pondered why the justifiable reliance standard86 
should bar fraud victims from recovery.  According to Dan Dobbs, it 
 
81. See supra note 7. 
82. See supra notes 8–13. 
83. See supra note 21. 
84. “One word encompasses all the grandeur and majesty of western civilization.  That word 
is ‘freedom’ . . . .  Not as well recognized, but equally true is that the absolute concomitant of 
freedom is responsibility . . . .”  Puckett v. Rufenacht, Bromagen & Hertz, Inc., 587 So. 2d 273, 
278 (Miss. 1991).  Puckett dismissed fraud claims brought by a self-directed investor who lost 
over $2 million, including his retirement fund, in commodities futures trading.  Id. 
85. See Levitin v. Paine Webber, Inc., 159 F.3d 698, 702 (2d Cir. 1998) (stating that the 
decision to invest in stocks is a decision to forego safer interest-bearing opportunities in order to 
seek out higher returns). 
86. Justifiable reliance, unlike securities fraud, is a subjective standard.  See supra notes 17–
19 and accompanying text. 
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may be an indirect way to assess other issues, namely, whether the 
plaintiff relied at all on a material misstatement and whether the 
defendant made the misstatement to induce reliance.  If the evidence 
establishes these conditions, the defendant should be held liable, even if 
plaintiff’s reliance appears foolish.87 
Applying this reasoning to securities fraud, it is certainly true that 
unhappy investors, having suffered a loss, may find it difficult to accept 
that the broker-dealer or corporate management is not to blame for their 
losses.  This may cause them, after the fact, to put too much weight on, 
and take out of context, statements that turned out to be incorrect.88  In 
addition, there is a fair amount of suspicion, whether deserved or not, 
about investors’ motives and worries about greedy investors seeking to 
extort payment from their innocent advisers.89 
One cognitive fallacy that courts have embraced is hindsight bias—
the concern that because something went wrong, its flaws should have 
been apparent at the start.  The fact that a broker’s recommendation did 
not result in gains does not establish fraud or breach of duty on the 
broker’s part; the fact that a corporation’s projections did not come to 
pass does not establish scienter.  Accordingly, courts must guard against 
plaintiffs’ pleading “fraud by hindsight.”90  Out of concern for hindsight 
bias, courts have increased the burden on plaintiffs to establish fraud.91 
Unfortunately, however, courts have gone too far in imposing due 
diligence obligations on investors.  It is simply unrealistic to expect 
unsophisticated investors to read lengthy disclosure documents, and 
given their complexity, it would be a waste of investors’ time.  Investors 
may sensibly rely on the recommendations of their advisers who invite 
their reliance and hold themselves out as trusted financial advisers and 
should not be expected to fact-check their advisers’ recommendations. 
 
87. DOBBS, supra note 17, § 474, at 1360–61. 
88. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc., 513 U.S. 561, 578 (1995) (stating that Congress did not 
intend to extend liability for misstatements to “every casual communication between buyer and 
seller”). 
89. Robert H. Mundheim, Professional Responsibilities of Broker-Dealers: The Suitability 
Doctrine, 1965 DUKE L.J. 445, 463–64 (discussing concerns that imposing civil liability for 
violations of industry standards “would be an invitation for disappointed customers to blackmail 
their broker-dealers”). 
90. See, e.g., Boyer v. Crown Stock Distribution, Inc., 587 F.3d 787, 794–95 (7th Cir. 2009); 
Elam v. Neidorff, 544 F.3d 921, 927–30 (8th Cir. 2008).  See also Mitu Gulati, Jeffrey J. 
Rachlinski & Donald C. Langevoort, Fraud by Hindsight, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 773, 775 (2004) 
(recognizing that courts cite concerns with hindsight bias in nearly one-third of published 
opinions in securities class action cases).  
91. See Gulati et al., supra note 90, at 775 (“Increasingly, the doctrine against ‘fraud by 
hindsight’ . . .  has become a hurdle that plaintiffs in securities cases must overcome.”). 
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CONCLUSION 
To date, courts have considered behavioral economics in securities 
regulation in two situations: (1) to cast doubt upon the fraud-on-the-
market presumption in the context of class certification of securities 
fraud class actions;92 and (2) to increase plaintiffs’ burden in 
establishing fraud.93  The efficient market hypothesis, with its strong 
belief in the efficiency of the markets, generally distrusts government 
regulation.94  Yet the efficient market hypothesis provided additional 
theoretical support to bolster pragmatic reasons for adopting the fraud-
on-the-market presumption.  In contrast, behavioral economics, with its 
emphasis on investors’ judgment errors, supports (at least to some 
degree) government paternalism.95  It is exceedingly ironic that 
behavioral economics, with its recognition of the cognitive fallibilities 
of investors, has, to date, been asserted to reduce investor protection.96 
The research from behavioral economics on cognitive failings has 
much to offer in rethinking the artificial construct of a “reasonable 
investor” and its resulting lack of protection for investors, particularly 
unsophisticated retail investors.  Despite their cognitive failings and 
their lack of training for the task,97 investors are forced to invest in the 
market to save for their retirement and for other expensive undertakings, 
such as their children’s college education.  Behavioral economics thus 
supports the need for (at least some) paternalistic responses to cognitive 
biases.98  Disclosure is not the panacea that drafters of federal securities 
 
92. See supra notes 61–63 and accompanying text. 
93. See supra notes 90–91. 
94. See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A 
Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1 (2002) (arguing that contract and 
market-based approaches are preferable to regulation).  
95. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1159 (2003) (arguing that behavioral findings should be used to attempt to steer people’s 
choices in welfare-promoting directions without eliminating freedom of choice).  Gilson and 
Kraakman recognize the need for paternalistic responses to cognitive bias, in particular to protect 
retail investors and their retirement savings.  MOME II, supra note 23, at 738. 
96. See Larry E. Ribstein, Fraud on a Noisy Market, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 137 (2006) 
(arguing that behavioral economics supports constraints on fraud-on-the-market because of 
difficulties in assessing how markets react to information). 
97. See Howell E. Jackson, To What Extent Should Individual Investors Rely on the 
Mechanisms of Market Efficiency: A Preliminary Investigation of Dispersion in Investor Returns, 
28 J. CORP. L. 671, 686 (2003) (recommending that the SEC should focus on educating retail 
investors about risks associated with equity investments, particularly the risks of undiversified 
investments and investment strategies with high transaction costs). 
98. Securities regulation must address a complex question, which two behavioral economists 
aptly stated: “How can we allow people of varying abilities and financial sophistication to express 
their preferences for investments without making them vulnerable to salespeople selling ‘snake 
oil’?”  GEORGE A. AKERLOF & ROBERT J. SHILLER, ANIMAL SPIRITS: HOW HUMAN 
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laws may have thought it to be.99  For example, requiring mutual funds 
to disclose fees and expenses has not deterred broker-dealers’ efforts to 
persuade their brokerage customers to purchase expensive actively 
managed proprietary mutual funds instead of low-cost index funds that 
offer better returns.100 
 Where is behavioral economics when investors need it? 
 
 
PSYCHOLOGY DRIVES THE ECONOMY, AND WHY IT MATTERS FOR GLOBAL CAPITALISM 175 
(2009). 
99. See generally Steven M. Davidoff & Claire A. Hill, Limits of Disclosure, 36 SEATTLE U. 
L. REV. 599 (2013) (arguing that disclosures cannot prevent market failure unless investors 
carefully read those disclosures and appraise the security on its merits before investing). 
100. See Mercer Bullard, Geoffrey C. Friesen & Travis Sapp, Investor Timing and Fund 
Distribution Channels (2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1070545 (finding that 
investors who transact through investment professionals in load-carrying mutual funds experience 
substantially poorer timing performance than investors who purchase pure no-load funds).  For an 
encouraging sign that times may be changing, see Kirsten Grind, Investors Sour on Pro Stock 
Pickers, WALL ST. J., Jan. 3, 2013, at A1 (reporting that in 2012, investors withdrew funds from 
actively managed funds and shifted into lower-cost funds that track the market). 
